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OF AUTONOMY, SACRED RIGHTS,
AND PERSONAL MARKS
Shyamkrishna Balganesh∗
INTRODUCTION
At the height of the Indian freedom movement, Mahatma Gandhi
was contacted by a manufacturer of clay tiles with a rather unusual
request: permission to use his image as a trademark for its roofing tiles.1
Gandhi’s response to the request was characteristically direct and
pointed, yet equally unusual: “I have no copyright in my portraits but I
am unable to give the consent you require.”2 While no expert in copyright or trademark law, Gandhi was of course an ardent champion of
personal freedom and individual autonomy.3 His inability (a euphemism
for unwillingness, of course) to consent to the use was hardly because of
an overriding intellectual property right that he recognized. Nor was it
obviously because he had plans to use or license his own image for a
competing commercial purpose. What then was the basis of Gandhi’s
refusal?
Gandhi’s response rather vividly captures the puzzle underlying the
“sacred rights” theory of identity-based trademarks, the subject of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Sol Goldman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Ashraf Ahmed,
Barton Beebe, Mala Chatterjee, Courtney Cox, Jennifer Rothman, and Jeremy Sheff for helpful
comments and suggestions.
1 Letter from Mahatma Gandhi to M. Rebello & Sons (May 31, 1931), in 52 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI 218, 218 & n.1 (1999).
2 Id. at 218 (emphasis added). Gandhi’s response was invoked more recently when the
German penmaker Montblanc sought to market a series of luxury pens bearing the image of Gandhi
on their nibs under the name “Mahatma Gandhi Limited Edition.” See, e.g., Amy Kazmin,
Fountains of Dismay Greet “Gandhi Pen,” FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.ft.com/
content/c97b5bc0-add9-11de-87e7-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/WDQ7-8T4B]; “Mahatma” Pens
from Mont Blanc, THE HINDU (Dec. 4, 2021, 10:47 PM), https://www.thehindu.com/news/
national/article60633467.ece [https://perma.cc/9EGQ-SK5G]. Under Indian law, any use of
Gandhi’s name or pictorial representation requires prior permission from the government, which
Montblanc did not obtain. See The Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act,
1950, § 3, sched. 1, at 9-A. Montblanc’s use of the name was eventually challenged in court,
Montblanc Not to Sell Gandhi Series Pen, THE HINDU (Dec. 16, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://
www.thehindu.com/news/national/Montblanc-not-to-sell-Gandhi-series-pen/article16816593.ece
[https://perma.cc/D5BA-ENWX], and the company soon withdrew the pens from the market, Dean
Nelson, Mont Blanc Apologises for Gandhi Pen, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 25, 2010, 2:13 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/7316148/Mont-Blanc-apologises-for-Gandhipen.html [https://perma.cc/ZR4U-M35L].
3 See generally CHARLES R. DISALVO, M.K. GANDHI, ATTORNEY AT LAW (2013); LOUIS
FISCHER, THE LIFE OF MAHATMA GANDHI (1950); RAMACHANDRA GUHA, GANDHI
BEFORE INDIA (2013); STANLEY WOLPERT, GANDHI’S PASSION (2001). For an account of
Gandhi’s engagement with copyright, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Essay, Gandhi and Copyright
Pragmatism, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1705 (2013).

343

344

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 135:343

Professor Jennifer Rothman’s engaging new article, Navigating the
Identity Thicket.4 In Rothman’s account, trademark law has long
embodied special rules for such identity-based “personal marks,” which
include “the portrait, name, or other indicia of identity of a natural person.”5 These rules, she argues, are rooted in the normative ideals of
“autonomy and dignity” as they relate to the individual whose identity
is at issue.6 She then attempts to explicate the theory underlying trademark law’s treatment of such personal marks, to draw out its broader
implications for courts to navigate the cluster of overlapping state rights
that regulate the ownership of identity.7
In this Response, I will focus on Rothman’s attempted extraction of
a coherent theory from the pockets of trademark law doctrines pertaining to personal marks, focusing on the article’s identification of autonomy as one of the key strands of that theory.8 While the doctrines that
she identifies do indeed exhibit critical commonalities, they at the same
time operate in analytically disparate ways, which calls into question
the identification of a unified normative coherence around them. And
while the article associates the law’s special rules for personal marks
with the values of autonomy and dignity, it does not specify what such
autonomy (and dignity) means within the private law framework of
trademark law. In so doing, I argue, it leaves open the likelihood that
allusions to autonomy (and dignity) are little more than courts’ attempted rationalizations of their positions, which risks undermining the
role of autonomy and other nonconsequentialist goals in trademark
and intellectual property law more generally. While the complexities of
autonomy are certainly not the focus of Rothman’s already exhaustive
article, they nevertheless raise a host of intriguing questions about the
theory that she derives from the area.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that nonutilitarian goals are not
normatively legitimate within intellectual property. To the contrary, I
believe that they do indeed remain crucial to the system’s overall normative pluralism.9 All the same, my concern is that underspecifying the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4 Jennifer Rothman, Navigating the Identity Thicket: Trademark’s Lost Theory of Personality,
The Right of Publicity, and Preemption, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2022). The phrase originates in
courts’ observation that “[t]he right to do business under one’s own name is one of the sacred rights
known to the law.” Tomsky v. Clark, 238 P. 950, 952 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Ida May Co. v.
Ensign, 66 P.2d 727, 729 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937); see also 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 85.2 (1945) (quoting case law).
5 Rothman, supra note 4, at 1276.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1336–49 (Part V).
8 Rothman identifies “autonomy and dignity” as the twin strands of this theory. Id. at 1276.
Given that the two are analytically distinct, my focus herein is on autonomy rather than dignity,
though some of my arguments may be fruitfully extended to the latter.
9 See WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES 6 (2010)
(“Normative pluralism is said to occur when two or more normative orders coexist in the same time-
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form and content of autonomy and dignity at play in the rules relating
to personal marks gives consequentialist10 arguments within the system
strategic cover in undesirable ways, some of which Rothman’s own argument hints at.
My argument begins by examining three different senses in which
the idea of autonomy might operate within trademark law’s rules
relating to personal marks and shows that each of them is critically incomplete or too weak to independently sustain the justificatory burden
for the domain. It then examines the worrisome possibility that courts’
allusions to autonomy here are little more than a trope for other considerations. It finally looks at how a genuine commitment to autonomy
might be integrated into the principally market-driven framework of
trademark law.
I. SACRED RIGHTS AND THE PUZZLE OF AUTONOMY
In what sense does trademark law’s treatment of personal marks
further the normative ideal of individual autonomy? While Rothman’s
account associates a justification based on autonomy and dignity with
each of trademark law’s rules for personal marks, the area as a whole
embodies three plausible conceptions of autonomy. Each suffers from
serious limitations as a standalone justification for the law’s treatment
of personal marks.
A. Autonomy in Identity Ownership?
The first plausible conception of autonomy underlying personal
marks derives from their status as property. This conception takes root
in the treatment of the “identity” embodied in personal marks as
an owned object. The connection between ownership and autonomy
has of course been the subject of extensive scholarship and debate.11
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
space context.”). For my own efforts to defend such pluralism in the face of an increasing emphasis
on utilitarianism in intellectual property, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Intellectual Property Law
and Redressive Autonomy, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PRIVATE LAW THEORY 161, 161 (Paul B.
Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020) [hereinafter Balganesh, Redressive Autonomy]; Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2020); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The
Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 233 (2012); and Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1543, 1574 (2010).
10 Consequentialism argues that “normative properties depend only on consequences.” Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/consequentialism
[https://perma.cc/BH42-NHDT]. Paradigmatic of consequentialism is utilitarianism. Id.
11 See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 3–5 (2021); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 23–24 (1990); Stephen Kershnar, Private
Property Rights and Autonomy, 16 PUB. AFFS. Q. 231 (2002); Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property
and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45 (1983); Alan Patten, Hegel’s Justification of Private Property, 16

346

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 135:343

Ownership in this conception functions as a vehicle for individual selfdetermination. Property rights facilitate and contribute to human autonomy by enabling individuals to exercise forms of control over objects
that are the subject of such rights.12 This ownership-driven autonomy
is therefore analogous to the notion of positive liberty and is decidedly
dependent on other additional conditions (for example, primary goods)
for its full realization.13
Yet central to the autonomy underlying ownership is the existence of
an external object that functions either as the end of such autonomy or
as the means through which such autonomy is realized.14 To Hegel, for
instance, property represents the actualization of the human will (“personality”) in the natural world, and it is through such property that the
will realizes itself.15 In other words, the object mediates the relationship
between the individual and the outside world, and it is such mediation
that helps realize the individual’s autonomy.16 To speak of an individual’s identity as the subject of an ownership interest is largely metaphorical, since it is hardly external in the same sense and resonates only
ever tangentially with ownership-driven autonomy.
A variant that has on occasion been put forth as a mechanism of
getting around the externalization concern with ownership-driven autonomy is the notion of “self-ownership,” which Rothman identifies as
one justificatory strand in the personal-marks jurisprudence.17 With the
idea of self-ownership, the argument is that ownership of one’s self —
that is, of one’s body — is necessary for human autonomy, since without
it humans are subject to being treated as means to ends and not ends in

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
HIST. POL. THOUGHT 576 (1995); Howard Williams, Kant’s Concept of Property, 27 PHIL. Q. 32
(1977).
12 DAGAN, supra note 11, at 2 (noting how property provides individuals with “some temporally
extended control over tangible and intangible resources, which they need in order to carry out their
projects and advance their plans”). For a similar account that relies on Hegel’s theory of ownership,
see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (“[T]o be a
person — an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.”).
13 See DAGAN, supra note 11, at 2, 3 (acknowledging this reality and describing it as the requirement of robust background conditions).
14 See id. at 50; Radin, supra note 12, at 957.
15 ALAN PATTEN, HEGEL’S IDEA OF FREEDOM 144 (2002).
16 Id.
17 Rothman, supra note 4, at 1297. See generally G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM,
AND EQUALITY (1995); George G. Brenkert, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Autonomy, 2 J.
ETHICS 27 (1998); Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Against Self-Ownership: There Are No FactInsensitive Ownership Rights over One’s Body, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 86 (2008); Alan Ryan, SelfOwnership, Autonomy, and Property Rights, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 241 (1994); Robert S. Taylor,
A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 65 (2004). For a slightly different version
of self-ownership, focused on individual identity, see Edward Feser, Personal Identity and SelfOwnership, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 100 (2005).
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themselves.18 While facially attractive, this argument breaks down on
closer scrutiny, since it is predicated on contingent truths about the ways
in which humans relate to their bodies, around which the underlying
conditions of necessity revolve.19 As philosophers have argued, autonomy — in the thick sense of being able to plan one’s life — is hardly
contingent on such self-ownership, even if in practice such ownership
furthers such plans.20 Extended to an intangible disconnected from the
actual physical body — that is, one’s identity — the link between selfownership and autonomy breaks down even further, since the res being
controlled (identity) is to a large extent notional and hardly the unilateral
creation of the putative owner (as opposed to a social construct).
Rothman’s discussion of “personal goodwill” rather vividly captures
the concern with the need for an external object in discussions of
ownership-autonomy.21 Insofar as a hallmark of such goodwill is its
inseparability from an individual, it is treated by the law as inalienable.22 Yet ironically it is such inalienability — deriving from the
inseparability — that calls into question the very claim that there is an
ownership interest in identity that in turn furthers individual autonomy.
Instead, it highlights the absence of an external object that is the basis
of such autonomy. While ownership can thus contribute to individual
autonomy, control over one’s identity (even as ownership) through a personal mark hardly does the same and risks producing an indelible circularity: control by law being justified as furthering autonomy when the
autonomy inheres in that very control.
B. Autonomy Preservation in Identity Use?
Another conception of autonomy that could justify the law’s treatment of personal marks eliminates the mediating role of ownership and
focuses instead directly on the role of identity in furthering the individual’s
agency. An individual’s use of their identity is autonomy-enhancing insofar as such identity allows the individual to determine their relationship to others in the world. A core aspect of the law of personal marks
was its refusal to impede an individual’s ability to use their identity in
trade by granting another a monopoly over a mark, a right that was
described in the jurisprudence as a “natural right” to use one’s own
name.23 By restricting the trademark monopoly from extending to personal names, the law might therefore be seen as protecting a sphere of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 See COHEN, supra note 17, at 116–17. Ironically, Kant himself rejected the idea of selfownership since persons were not things in his classification. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON
ETHICS 165–66 (Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1930).
19 See Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 117.
20 See COHEN, supra note 17, at 230, 240; Lippert-Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 117–18.
21 See Rothman, supra note 4, at 1311–14.
22 Id. at 1313.
23 See id. at 1299; HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 69, at 174–77 (3d ed. 1929) (quoting case law).
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autonomy from incursion. While on its face this argument may seem
intuitive, on deeper scrutiny it hides more than it reveals.
To begin with, it is important to appreciate the analytical structure
of the autonomy-based argument that is at play. The domain of individual autonomy involved in this conception is logically antecedent to
trademark law. In other words, all that the rules relating to personal
marks do here is to minimize the reach of trademark law’s grant of exclusivity by preventing it from interfering with an individual’s trademarkindependent use of their identity (in or outside of commerce). These
rules do little to protect an individual’s affirmative use of identity, even
in commerce, except to characterize such use as “natural.”24 Trademark
law’s rules on personal marks thus at best preserve an individual’s autonomy in the use of their name (or other aspect of identity), and it is in
this preservation that these rules could be seen as motivated by autonomy. Yet two cumulative aspects of this claim weaken its import further.
First, as a purely analytical matter, the harm — or autonomy interference — that the law is protecting against in this conception is one
that is entirely a creation of trademark law’s own grant of an exclusive
right to a markholder. Recall that the autonomy incursion in question
is meant to arise when a markholder attempts to enjoin an individual
from using their own name in trade, something that is only made possible because of the right that trademark law grants holders. Absent such
a right, the individual’s use autonomy would not be implicated, qua this
conception. And to the extent that the attempt to enjoin such use comes
from other domains, the limited protection afforded by trademark law
is meaningless, since it has little spillover value outside of that domain.
In a sense, therefore, what is described as autonomy-preservation might
be well recast as a definitional aspect of the right at issue. Yet what this
reveals is the artificiality of the connection to autonomy, which is fairly
contrived. If it is in this sense that the rules relating to personal marks
relate to the autonomy of individuals, it is at best a weak connection.
Second, and despite the rhetoric about the right (to the use of one’s
own name in trade) being “natural” and “absolute,”25 courts have long
remained willing to prevent such use when it was seen as an act of unfair
competition — a category within which they have included a whole host
of presumptively problematic behavior, including deception and passing
off.26 Rothman recognizes that these limits undermined the absolute
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24 See, e.g., Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 39 N.E. 490, 491 (N.Y. 1895) (“The right
of a person to use his family name in his business is regarded as a natural right, of which he cannot
be deprived, by reason simply of priority of use by another of the same name.”).
25 See, e.g., Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, 431 (1875) (“[E]very man has the absolute right to
use his own name in his own business.”).
26 See id. at 431–33 (collecting cases).
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nature of the right and acknowledges that the right was never truly absolute,27 yet she notes that courts nevertheless accorded dishonest defendants “latitude” to continue to use their names for honest commercial
purposes when constructing their injunctions.28 True as that may well
be, the very presence of a basis on which courts policed the exercise of
these rights suggests an even narrower concern with autonomy than
what the preservation claim implies. Put another way, the law merely
sought to preserve a domain of use for honest commercial uses by individuals of their own names when trademark law was likely to interfere
with such use. Such honest commercial use is hard to see as based on
an absolute right of autonomy.
The autonomy-preservation claim may well reflect “respect” for a
defendant’s “personality rights” over the rights of the trademark holder,
as Rothman points out.29 Yet such respect does not on its own offer the
domain a sufficiently robust standalone justification that is rooted in a
concern with individual autonomy.
C. Autonomy by Preventing Identity Misuse?
The most plausible conception of autonomy that justifies this domain
of trademark law originates in the flip side of the identity use just described — that is, in situations where the law does not just preserve an
individual’s use of their own name, but also empowers that individual
to prevent the unauthorized use of their name by others in commerce.
Trademark law also seeks to prevent the misuse of personal marks by
individuals and entities having no connection to the identity embodied
in the mark, by requiring for such use the consent of the individual
whose identity is to be used.30 The Gandhi episode discussed earlier is
illustrative.31 All the same, the requirement applies only when the use
is commercial.
Consequently, the rules relating to personal marks may be seen as
protecting an individual’s autonomy by guarding against inauthentic
market-based uses of the individual’s identity. Insofar as such (mis)use
in commerce interferes with the individual’s ability to use their identity
to interact with the outside world — even independent of the market —
trademark law offers the individual a modicum of protection. In other
words, a defendant’s use in commerce becomes unlawful quite independently of the plaintiff’s own use, protection that may be seen as moderately autonomy-enhancing.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27
28
29
30
31

Rothman, supra note 4, at 1276, 1303–05.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
See id. at 1307–09.
See supra p. 343.
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Much like the prior version of autonomy just discussed, this version
too is obviously a negative one in the sense of eliminating obstacles to
an individual’s realization of their own goals.32 All the same, it is fundamentally different from the autonomy-preservation variant, insofar as
the infraction that it offers protection against is not an artificial byproduct of trademark’s monopoly, but instead a form of harm that might
arise from trademark-independent behavior (that is, impersonation).
And it is also affirmative in the limited sense of affording the individual
a mechanism of redress at private law.33 Yet, being principally negative
in analytical structure, it requires a clearer understanding of how it seeks
to eliminate — albeit through private redress — an interference with
autonomy. As we shall see, that autonomy is principally a market-based
commercial one — that is, in the use of one’s identity in commerce —
which needs to be acknowledged.
At times, Navigating the Identity Thicket appears to suggest that the
autonomy at stake is more than just a market-based one. Rothman, for
instance, concedes that while the negative protection is “partially rooted
in market-based concerns of identity-holders,” it is “also rooted in protecting a person’s dignity and autonomy.”34 What Rothman appears to
be suggesting is that an unauthorized use of another’s identity in the
marketplace not just impedes that individual’s own use of their identity
in the marketplace, but also influences that individual’s perceived relationship to the outside world. What this still does not fully answer is
just how the unauthorized “use in commerce”35 interferes with the individual’s own identity outside of that commercial context — that is, its
spillover effects — so as to raise it beyond “market-based concerns.”36
To take an example from the article, how exactly did the sale of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32 The idea of negative autonomy tracks Isaiah Berlin’s famous idea of negative liberty. See
ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 15–16 (1958); see also A.S. Kaufman, Discussion,
Professor Berlin on “Negative Freedom,” 71 MIND 241 (1962). For extensions of the negative framing into the realm of autonomy, see Michael J. Meyer, Stoics, Rights, and Autonomy, 24 AM. PHIL.
Q. 267, 267 (1987) (describing negative autonomy in terms of not being “directed by another”). For
a critique, see ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
LIBERTY 4 (Routledge 2017) (1986).
33 See Balganesh, Redressive Autonomy, supra note 9, at 161. This is in contrast to the entitlement structure of the putative autonomy claim in the prior variant, which focuses on the overbreadth of trademark protection. Autonomy in that variant is more in the nature of a Hohfeldian
immunity, whereas here it partakes of a power. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917).
34 Rothman, supra note 4, at 1306 (emphases added).
35 For a general account of trademark law’s “use in commerce” requirement and its connection
to commerciality, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism
in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1609–15 (2007). The requirement of “use in commerce”
is codified in the Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), as a limitation on both protectability, see 15 U.S.C. § 1127, and
infringement, see 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
36 Rothman, supra note 4, at 1306.
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“Dewey’s Chewies” affect Admiral George Dewey’s ability to use his
good name outside of the market?37
Now, if the answer is that it interfered with the Admiral’s ability to
sell his own brand of chewies, or license the use of his market, the concern is obviously less about autonomy and instead is a “market-based”
one.38 The unauthorized use certainly would not have impeded the
Admiral’s use of his name in the noncommercial context unless the unauthorized use of the chewies was so extensive as to make the Admiral’s
name unrecognizable in any other context, including noncommercial
ones, which is very unlikely. If that were true — or even likely to occur — a clear case might indeed be made for the harm to autonomy that
the Admiral might suffer. But the only sense in which it is likely to have
interfered with the Admiral’s use of his name is in shaping his commercial interactions, by denying him the choice of whether to be represented
as associated with or endorsing the chewies being sold under his name.
Yet these are primarily “market-based concerns,”39 rendering it unclear
how the law goes beyond them to considerations of autonomy — other
than by invoking the idea of individual identity.40
To be clear, a market-based autonomy rooted in the commercial representation of one’s identity is no doubt a form of autonomy. All the
same, it is again an extremely narrow form of protection for individual
autonomy against impersonation, one that is restricted to the market
and the realm of commerce. Further, it is analytically unclear how and
why this protection — qua autonomy — is any different from the protection against misuse accorded to a made-up name (such as a corporate
name), except that the law identifies the connection as being natural in
one and not in the other.
*

*

*

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37
38
39
40

Id. at 1308–09.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
One way of recognizing the nonmarket harm that Dewey might suffer would be to focus on
the harm to his reputation (rather than his use of his identity) that might have come about through
the unauthorized use of his name. Harm to reputation is undoubtedly a dignitary harm, and as
such derives from the normative ideal of dignity. Yet dignity is distinct from autonomy. Whereas
autonomy is about control and self-determination, dignity focuses on self-respect and value, and is
a decidedly relational ideal. In prior work, Rothman does an excellent job of distinguishing the
two. See Robert C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment and the Right(s) of
Publicity, 130 YALE L.J. 86, 121 (2020) (“If the value of autonomy strives to promote the independence
of persons, the value of dignity presupposes and protects their interdependence.”). To be sure,
Rothman invokes both autonomy and dignity in her narrative, though it is not clear if she sees the
two as interconnected within the domain of the personal market. See Rothman, supra note 4, at
1294–318. My focus herein is limited to autonomy.
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Each of these conceptions of autonomy remains unsatisfactory as a
stand-alone justification for trademark law’s treatment of personal
marks. Each is hampered by serious limitations internal to the doctrines
involved, which significantly curtail the law’s potential focus on autonomy and call into question the extent to which such autonomy is indeed
at the heart of the law’s treatment of personal marks.
II. AUTONOMY AS RATIONALIZATION
Despite embracing the idea that trademark law’s treatment of personal marks emanates primarily from considerations of autonomy and
dignity, Navigating the Identity Thicket nevertheless concedes in multiple places that these considerations routinely overlap with other marketbased ones.41 This overlap raises two concerns. The first is that the
rhetoric and language of autonomy and personality are little more than
mechanisms for courts to rationalize their consequentialist intuitions in
the language of morality so as to render them more palatable to audiences. And the second is that autonomy as a normative value is notoriously difficult to integrate with other consequentialist or utilitarian
values without undermining its very nature. This Part focuses on the
first, while the next addresses the second.
Regardless of whether “[w]e are all [L]egal [R]ealists now,”42 one of
the enduring lessons of Legal Realism is its revelation that the formal
reasoning seen in judicial opinions routinely fails to capture the full extent of judges’ influences and motivations in deciding cases.43 This lack
of candor and transparency came to be explained either as driven by
bad faith, wherein judges actively conceal the real basis of their
decisionmaking for fear that it will betray their biases,44 or instead as
the simple result of a mismatch between the “hunch” or intuition at the
heart of the decision and the available criteria for the judge to employ
in the opinion.45 In either case, Legal Realists believed judges’ real
bases for their decisions to be covered up in their formal reasoning, a
process known as “rationalization.”46
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41
42
43

E.g., Rothman, supra note 4, at 1298, 1306, 1324, 1330.
Joseph William Singer, Review Essay, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988).
See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (2015)
(“What the Legal Realists taught us is that too often the doctrine that courts invoke is not really the
normative standard upon which they really rely.”).
44 For an extreme version of this argument, see generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930). See also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 268 (1997) (collecting similar accounts).
45 See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929).
46 Leiter, supra note 44, at 267; see also Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How
Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 361 (1925). The notion of rationalization is traced back to Freud’s
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Rothman is undoubtedly correct to observe that the language of
cases dealing with rights in personal marks hints at considerations of
autonomy, dignity, and personality. The references to “sacred” rights,
“natural and inalienable rights,” and the like suggest the existence of a
deontic rationale for these rules.47 It is, however, possible that this deontic terminology is little more than a formalization of other nondeontic
considerations. These considerations need not encompass the formal
idea of efficiency; however, the looming presence of the market and commerce in relation to all of the cases that address personal marks cannot
be ignored, because it hints at the possibility of consequentialist considerations driving the outcomes.
One explanation for this mismatch is of course the possibility of bad
faith reasoning among judges, something that the Realists emphasized.
In this version, the real — consequentialist and utilitarian — considerations are consciously hidden from the public reasoning of a judicial
opinion and replaced instead with more acceptable arguments from deontic morality. One need not, however, accept this extreme version (of
bad faith reasoning) for the same logic of mismatch to be explanatorily
significant. A more benign explanation for the mismatch might be found
in a phenomenon best described as “radical semantic evaluation,” developed by Professor Jody Kraus as a philosophical defense of explanatory
economic analysis in the common law.48
On this account, common law terms and concepts that originate with
a distinctively deontic meaning, such as “right” and “duty,” over time
assume nondeontic, or consequentialist meaning by virtue of their being
embedded in a system that is motivated by such nondeontic considerations.49 This evolution is fueled by the facial indeterminacy of such
terms, which allows for their infusion with such contextually determined
meaning.50 Such semantic evolution results in participants within the
system coming to understand their deployment of such concepts as having a distinctive meaning within the system of practice that they are in,
often one that is removed from their original semantic meaning taken in
the abstract.
Radical semantic evolution might well explain the role of terms
found in the personal-marks jurisprudence, which semantically imply
an autonomy-driven emphasis in the doctrine, one that is nevertheless
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
work, which Legal Realism deployed. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–
1960, at 20 (1986).
47 Rothman, supra note 4, at 1299 (quoting, inter alia, Tomsky v. Clark, 238 P. 950, 952 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1925); Hilton v. Hilton, 104 A. 375, 376 (N.J. 1918)).
48 Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical
Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 303 (2007); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 238 (2008).
49 See Kraus, supra note 48, at 328–29.
50 Id. at 332.
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hard to square with its working. Terms such as “natural,” “sacred,” and
“inalienable”51 used to describe the “so-called ‘absolute right’”52 that an
individual presumptively has in their own name certainly suggest the
presence of deontic considerations, semantically. All the same, even insofar as these terms are used to invoke considerations of identity use
(and misuse), the context of their deployment within a market setting —
that is, in the regulation of uses in commerce — arguably gives them a
contextual meaning that is consequentialist in orientation. In other
words, the right to use one’s name for a commercial purpose, or to prevent the unauthorized use of one’s name by another in commerce, may
relate to the individual’s identity, but the commercial use of a name
imbues it with a different meaning: as a preferential entitlement to trade
using one’s own name, a preference that is predicated on a balancing of
competing consequentialist considerations.
At least part of the reason, one suspects, for trademark law’s reliance
on the language of deontic morality for its doctrinal content in this area
is the close connection between the law relating to personal marks and
the domains of privacy law and publicity rights, both of which have
significantly firmer nonconsequentialist roots principally as a result of
their not being limited to commerce. This is a reality that Rothman
acknowledges when she notes that claims relating to personal marks
were usually brought in conjunction with claims from these other areas.53 Consequently, it is not surprising that courts borrowed the same
language to describe the nature of the interest involved in personal
marks, even when the context was unquestionably utilitarian.
The possibility of such semantic evolution in the normative content
of the concepts involved is supported by a cursory examination of the
manner in which more modern courts deploy the language of the early
jurisprudence in opinions that Rothman discusses. For instance,
Rothman analyzes the 1875 case of Meneely v. Meneely,54 which found
an injunction restraining a defendant from making any use of his own
name in trade to be overbroad, in the process implying deontic origins
for the entitlement and describing the defendant’s claim as driven by an
“absolute right.”55 By 1966, we see this view shifting in the same court,
the New York Court of Appeals.56 Even though the court continued to
refer to the entitlement in the use of one’s own name in trade as a “right,”
it was equivocal about the deontic origins of the right, referring to it as
originating in the “so-called ‘sacred right’ theory” and emphasizing that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
51
52
53
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Rothman, supra note 4, at 1299 (quoting, inter alia, Tomsky, 238 P. at 952; Hilton, 104 A. at 376).
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1297.
62 N.Y. 427 (1875).
Id. at 431.
David B. Findlay, Inc. v. Findlay, 218 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1966).
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this did not render it “unlimited,” despite what the term might imply.57
The majority opinion in that case consciously sought to distance itself
from the implicit reasoning of Meneely,58 which a dissent readily called
out.59 The majority’s response was merely that “[t]he present trend of
the law is to enjoin the use even of a family name” when there was a
tendency of potential confusion in the marketplace,60 more than suggesting (a) that the “right” was a relational entitlement that required balancing, and (b) that it was equally driven by commercial considerations.
Perhaps then, we should be more circumspect about taking courts’
use of deontic language to imply a commitment to autonomy, dignity, or
other moral concerns in developing the law, and examine whether a
combination of the language and its contextual application indeed merits being seen as a commitment to such concerns in practice.
III. INTEGRATING AUTONOMY INTO THE THEORY
OF PERSONAL MARKS
Assuming for a moment that a conception of autonomy is indeed
behind some or all of trademark law’s rules relating to personal marks,
the critical question that this then raises is whether such autonomy remains functionally compatible with the other consequentialist values
that operate in the domain. As we have seen, courts acknowledge that
even in relation to personal marks, commercial considerations (predominantly utilitarian) are important in their framing of the relevant rules.61
How exactly then is autonomy to be integrated with these overtly consequentialist normative considerations?
Rendering autonomy compatible with other normative values is far
from straightforward and is at the root of the concern with incommensurability that has been a staple of debates about the confluence of
deontological and consequentialist values within legal doctrine.62 For
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
57 Id. at 534 (emphasis added). Indeed, the court began its opinion with the observation: “When
should a man’s right to use his own name in his business be limited? This is the question before
us.” Id. at 532.
58 See id. at 534–35.
59 Id. at 535–36 (Burke, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 534 (majority opinion).
61 See, e.g., Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N.Y. 427, 431–32 (1875); Findlay, 218 N.E.2d at 534.
62 For leading work on incommensurability in philosophy, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); and INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). For applications of the idea in law, see
Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371 (1998);
Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1487 (1998); Richard Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, Or Is Utility the Ruler
of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683; Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994); and Francisco J. Urbina, Incommensurability and Balancing,
35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (2015).
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the idea of autonomy to remain true to its deontological orientation and
yet coexist side by side with instrumental considerations within an area,
it is crucial for that area to develop a mechanism that integrates the two
without requiring either to abandon its foundational tenets. In identifying an autonomy-focused justification for personal marks within the
overall utilitarian framework of trademark law, Navigating the Identity
Thicket introduces autonomy into the mix of normative values influencing the area. Critical to the success of this identification is the presence
of a methodology of pluralism that allows autonomy to function within
trademark law, without undermining the rest of the domain’s core normative tenets.
While I do not purport to have a comprehensive answer to this challenge, the overall orientation of the doctrine lends itself to a strategy of
normative pluralism that some have described as “vertical,” insofar as it
advances a “unified theory” with “logically distinct” components.63
Versions of such integration can be seen in the theories of Kant, Rawls,
and legal scholars attempting to reconcile autonomy and consequentialist goals (most commonly efficiency) in the working of legal doctrine, by
ordering them lexically and then sequencing the manner in which they
are considered as part of the analysis.64
Adopting this framing for trademark law’s treatment of personal
marks, one might therefore argue that the law begins with the recognition of a natural (or moral) right in individuals to control their
representation in the world, and thereupon comes to qualify that right
sequentially in recognition of the utilitarian framework that the right is
being deployed into. The key to the success of this integration strategy
is, however, the analytical separation of the autonomy-focused inquiry
from the utilitarian one, even if they are both ultimately components of
the same adjudicatory framework. In other words, the concern with
autonomy ought to be given full and independent ventilation, and only
thereafter should it come to be qualified by utilitarian considerations
deriving from the overall orientation of the system. What then might
this look like in practice?
As an illustration, consider cases that allow a plaintiff to enjoin a
defendant’s misuse of their identity when the defendant deploys the
plaintiff’s name in commerce without prior consent. The first step in
the inquiry would begin with an examination of the extent to which a
plaintiff’s concern with individual autonomy is implicated by the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
63 Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 421 (2001).
64 See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 62, at 1507–12 (Epstein and Hart); Kraus, supra note 63, at
423–25 (Rawls); Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 632–
38 (2002) (Kant). For a definition of lexical ordering, see Adam M. Samaha, If the Text Is Clear —
Lexical Ordering in Statutory Interpretation, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 162 (2018) (“Successful
lexical ordering creates a particular kind of priority among considerations that might be used to
make a single decision.”).
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defendant’s behavior. Instead of relying purely on the rhetoric of a “natural” or “sacred” right, the inquiry should instead scrutinize the defendant’s behavior and the extent to which it is likely to interfere with a
plaintiff’s ability to represent themselves to the external world — both
in commerce and potentially beyond (perhaps analogous to the inquiry
in blurring). If that risk is nonexistent or negligible, that should be the
end of the inquiry. Otherwise, the inquiry should move to the second
step, looking to the practical and introducing various utilitarian considerations into the equation, most of which will be defendant- and publicfocused. This framing would introduce a measure of sequenced lexical
ordering into the inquiry,65 which would separate autonomy and nonautonomy considerations during the analysis.
As with any form of lexical ordering or sequenced analysis, the separation is easier to achieve in theory than it is in practice. Courts will
of course invariably blend the two in practice. Yet such sequencing will
have the salutary effect of acknowledging — beyond plain rhetoric —
the plausibility that autonomy, as a separate normative concern underlying personal marks, has a role to play in the construction of the cause
of action at issue. And once this happens, it will be on courts to determine whether their deployment of the deontic logic of morality into this
domain is more than just rhetorical, or instead a true embrace of normative pluralism.
CONCLUSION
Navigating the Identity Thicket does an excellent job of laying bare
a puzzle that appears to have plagued trademark jurisprudence for over
a century now. All the same, in embracing the plausibility of autonomy
and other deontic concerns motivating the law of personal marks, it
stops short of addressing the larger puzzle of integrating autonomy with
the overall commercial (that is, consequentialist) orientation of modern
trademark law, an orientation that is neither superficial nor recent but
rather well entrenched in today’s trademark law thinking.66
In so doing, Rothman accepts the idea that autonomy is doing serious
normative work in this domain. My principal concerns with the article’s
argument are thus twofold: (1) that we ought to be doing more than just
accepting courts’ framing (and rhetoric) before believing that autonomy
drives the decisionmaking in this domain, even if only partially; and (2)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Kraus, supra note 63, at 423.
See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24
(2004) (noting how law and economics “has long offered a . . . definitive theory of American trademark law,” id. at 623, and that “[t]he influence of this analysis is now nearly total,” id. at 624);
Jeremy N. Sheff, Marks, Morals, and Markets, 65 STAN. L. REV. 761, 765 (2013) (“The dominant
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that even if we accept this as true, the modality of autonomy’s functioning therein deserves further reflection.
None of this should take away from the serious contribution that the
article makes to both trademark law and broader theorizing in intellectual property scholarship, which, for the most part, has assumed a utilitarian stance without additional scrutiny. Courts and scholars continue
to puzzle over the anomalous nature of trademark’s rules relating to
personal marks, an anomaly that may well result in their eventual abandonment.67 Rothman’s article suggests to such skeptics that they would
do well to pause and recalibrate their own normative lenses before scrutinizing this domain, and that utilitarianism and commerciality may in
fact not exhaust the list of trademark law’s foundational values.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 For an account of a recent effort by a court to understand the origins of these rules, see Kyle
Jahner, Identifying Marks Ban Probed in “Trump Too Small” Case, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 3,
2021, 5:17 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/ban-on-person-identifying-marks-probed-intrump-too-small-case [https://perma.cc/VDQ6-3K5A].

